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Perceptions of West Virginia Beef Cattle Producers  
on Preparedness for an Agroterrorism Attack 
 
Rebecca Laura Ours 
Biosecurity is a measure that can help protect beef producers from financial loss 
associated with an agroterrorism attack.  This study sought to determine West Virginia 
beef producers’ perceptions of the potential for agroterrorism and what biosecurity 
measures they practice.  A mailed questionnaire was sent to a sample population of 355 
beef producers, with a response rate of 47.7%. Beef producers in West Virginia agreed 
that agroterrorism could happen in the United States and in West Virginia; however, the 
majority did not feel it would happen on their farms.  A majority of the respondents 
indicated they would attend a program on agroterrorism and that their most common 
source of information on biosecurity measures was popular agriculture magazines. 
Isolating new animals was perceived to be the most important biosecurity measure that 
could be practiced on their farms, but less than half of the producers reported that they 
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The United States Department of Agriculture’s Agricultural Research Service 
(USDA-ARS) estimates one in every eight persons works in some part of the 
agriculture/food sector (Schneider, Schneider, Webb, Hubbard, & Archer, 2009).  
Agriculture and food production account for 13 percent of the United States gross 
domestic product (GDP), 18 percent of its employment, and 140 billion dollars in 
revenue (USDA, 2006).  Agroterrorism is the deliberate introduction of detrimental 
agents, biological and otherwise, into the agricultural and food processing system with 
the intent of causing actual or perceived harm (Schneider, et al., 2009).  An agroterrorism 
attack could affect many people throughout the world. However, a study by DeGraw 
(2005) found that many beef producers in Florida did not think it was necessary to be 
prepared for an agroterrorism attack.  
 Food production is one of the largest industries in the United States. If the food 
supply of America would be attacked, it would be hard for people to survive. Maintaining 
a safe food supply is a necessity. Contamination and adulteration of food for a target 
population could be an ideal target for terrorist attacks. Terrorists could attack the U.S. 
and no one would ever realize it until it had already made a huge impact on people. The 
international trade of agricultural goods is crucial to the U.S. (Schneider et al., 2009). If 
the agricultural industry in the U.S. is attacked, the financial losses would be devastating 
not only to producers in the U.S., but other countries as well. 
Bioterrorism is defined as the use of a biological agent in a deliberate, harmful 
attack, or terrorism using the weapons of biological warfare such as anthrax, smallpox, or 
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other pathogens (Schneider et al., 2009). Bioterrorism can target not only the agriculture 
industry, but also, the general population. The anthrax incident in the U.S. postal system 
after September 11 is an example of a bioterrorism attack (Schneider et al., 2009). 
Awareness of food security in the United States was heightened after the 
September 11th attack.  On June 12, 2002, the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 was signed in to law by Congress (Schneider et 
al., 2009).  The Act was established to help prevent a bioterrorism attack on the food 
supply in the United States.  The Food and Drug Administration is responsible for 
implementing regulations on food production and distribution (Schneider et al., 2009).    
Consumer demand for beef declines during disease outbreaks in cattle which in 
turn impacts production. During an outbreak of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 
(BSE) in the United States beef production declined for a couple of years (USDA, 2009).  
In 2008, 26.56 pounds of beef per person were produced in the United States (USDA, 
2009).  Decline in demand for beef could result from a number of factors, including 
changes in eating habits for health reasons or more vegans, and vegetarians (USDA, 
2009).  
Biosecurity procedures can help prevent farm visitors from carrying organisms on 
to farms and spreading diseases from farm to farm. Farm visitors can pose a risk for 
many reasons, including carrying pathogens from one farm to another. If a visitor has 
been out of the country; they pose an increased threat by carrying disease from foreign 
soil to a local farm. A biosecurity plan might include requiring visitors to change clothing 
and shoes, to disinfecting vehicles, and not having close contact with any animals 
(APHIS, 2007).  For beef producers an effective biosecurity plan can make their cattle 
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less susceptible to diseases, which could prevent loss of income. Preventative measures 
can keep cattle safe from diseases and other harmful organisms. Proper nutrition and 
management practices including a clean environment will reduce susceptibility to 
diseases (APHIS, 2007).   
There are broadly based convictions that producers livelihoods and the public are 
best served by organizing, funding, and enforcing strict disease control guidelines 
through government intervention (Dargatz, & Dargatz, 2002). Government agencies have 
mandated biosecurity plans for livestock producers. The aim of specific biosecurity 
programs is to combat specific health hazards on the farm such as BSE, Foot and Mouth 
Disease, Rabies, and Influenza (Valergakis, Aresenos, & Konomou, 2008).  However, the 
lack of direct or perceived incentives to adopting biosecurity technologies on beef cattle 
farms has resulted in few beef producers who are implementing recommended 
biosecurity practices. 
Biosecurity includes prevention and security. Prevention is the most important 
and cost effective line of defense against harmful organisms (Meyerson, & Reaser, 2002). 
Studies have found that producers are not following good management practices or 
implementing biosecurity plans (DeGraw, 2005). Failure to follow biosecurity 
recommendations poses a great risk of introducing diseases to the cattle herd. 
Management practices such as vaccinating on schedule and quarantining new animals 
brought on the farm can help prevent outside organisms from infecting the existing herds 
(Sanderson, Dargatz, & Garry, 2000).
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Problem Statement  
There are 10,653 beef producers in West Virginia.  Unlike the poultry industry 
where biosecurity plans are required for each operation, beef producers are not required 
to have biosecurity plans.  Are West Virginia beef producers aware of biosecurity 
practices and the impact the lack of biosecurity practices can have on their farms due to 
diseases and potential financial loss? What are West Virginia beef producers’ perceptions 
of the potential for an agroterrorism attack and what biosecurity measures are they 
practicing?   
Purpose of the Study 
 The purpose of the study was to determine West Virginia beef cattle producers’ 
perceptions of their preparedness for an agroterrorism attack. Have they implemented 
biosecurity plans, and to what degree? What is West Virginia beef producers’ level of 
knowledge about recommended biosecurity measures and where do they get their 
information regarding biosecurity practices?   
Objectives of the Study 
The following objectives were used to guide the research:  
1. Identify West Virginia beef producers’ preparedness for an agroterrorism attack. 
2. Identify current biosecurity practices of West Virginia beef producers.  
3. Identify West Virginia beef producers’ perceptions of risk related to bioterrorism 
and agroterrorism. 
4. Identify where West Virginia beef producers go for information on biosecurity. 
5. Determine West Virginia beef producers’ preferred delivery methods for 




Review of Literature 
Realization that food security could be an issue in the United States became more 
evident after the September 11, 2001 terrorism attack. After the attack more precautions 
and regulations were put into effect for many areas of the economy. Agriculture was 
more vulnerable to terrorists because it was one way to hurt mass numbers of people and 
the economy. Soon afterward the attack new rules and guidelines were developed to 
reduce the agriculture industry’s vulnerability. On June 12, 2002, the Public Health 
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 was signed in to law 
(Schneider, et. al, 2009).  According to Schneider, Schneider, Webb, Hubbard, and 
Archer (2009) the U.S. has not been the victim of a large-scale, successful agroterrorism 
attack. The Act was designed to improve the ability of the U.S. to prevent, prepare for, 
and respond to bioterrorism and other public health emergencies (Schneider, et al, 2009).  
Kelly (2005) states that it seems obvious, that the need for adequate biosecurity measures 
on our farms should not be allowed to wait until agroterrorism becomes a reality.  
Agroterrorism is the deliberate introduction of detrimental agents, biological and 
otherwise, into the agricultural and food processing system with the intent of causing 
actual or perceived harm (Schneider, et al., 2009). There are many broad areas of 
agriculture that can provide targets for an agroterrorism attack such as; livestock and 
farm animals, plant crops, food processing, distribution, and retailing. 
Bioterrorism is defined as the use of a biological agent in a deliberate, harmful 
attack, or terrorism using the weapons of biological warfare such as anthrax, smallpox, or 
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other pathogens (Schneider, et al., 2009). A bioterrorism attack can be directed at 
agriculture, the general public, domestic infrastructure or personnel.  
Veterinary medicine has found that biosecurity measures can protect farms. The 
veterinary profession is presently challenged with developing and maintaining on-farm 
biosecurity protocols to protect the nation’s food supply from acts of bioterrorism, from 
the growing threat of foreign animal disease, and from multidrug resistance among 
pathogenic organisms. Veterinarians have seen that farmers are resistant to implementing 
biosecurity practices until an agroterrorism attack becomes a reality. Veterinarians 
indicate that this is an issue and that farmers should not wait for an attack to occur (Kelly, 
2005). The challenge comes at a time when the supply of food animal veterinarians in the 
U.S. is progressively in decline, and raises the possibility that the profession is not 
adequately prepared to fulfill its responsibilities to the health and productivity of the U.S. 
livestock and poultry populations (Kelly, 2005). 
The United States Department of Agriculture (2006) stated that agriculture and 
food production accounts for thirteen percent of the United States’ gross domestic 
product; eighteen percent of its employment; and one hundred and forty billion dollars in 
revenue. There is an increased awareness of the vulnerability of agriculture and food 
products to agroterrorism attacks.  The United Sates Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) are charged with ensuring the safety of 
America’s food supply. It is their job to assure the American people that the food coming 
from the farm will remain safe until it reaches the consumer.  
The goal of biosecurity is to stop the transmission of disease causing agents by 
preventing, minimizing or controlling cross-contamination of body fluids between 
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animals, animals to feed and animals to equipment that may directly and indirectly 
contact animals (Buhman, Dewett, & Griffin, 2007).  Biosecurity is a sum of risk 
management practices as a defense against biological threats (Meyerson, & Reaser, 
(2002). 
The United States (U.S.) has identified as priorities, the protection of national 
systems and infrastructure such as the transportation, communication, water supply, and 
agriculture networks, to defend against terrorism. (Schneider, et al., 2009), but holes in 
prevention, preparedness, and response remain. Government agencies have been involved 
with most of the well-defined programs of biosecurity for livestock producers.  
 It is important for farmers to be able to get information on biosecurity and then to 
implement a biosecurity plan on their farm. While developing and maintaining 
biosecurity can be difficult, it is the cheapest, most effective means of disease control 
available, and no disease prevention program will work without it (Buhman, Dewett, & 
Griffin, 2007). While it may not be possible for individuals to prevent a disease from 
arriving on our nation’s shores, biosecurity practices can reduce the risk of introducing a 
disease onto a farm or spreading it to neighboring farms (APHIS, 2007).    
 Failure to follow biosecurity practices leaves farms unprotected and exposed to 
many potentially harmful things. On the farm, one of the greatest risks comes from 
bringing new animals onto the premises or comingling or exposing your animals to other 
animals. It is a common way to introduce new disease-causing organisms (APHIS, 2007). 
Some basic facts that would help farmers to limit biosecurity risks on their farms would 
be to understand the need to quarantine animals for at least 30 days when first brought on 
to a farm, not to use manure machinery for feeding, not to share equipment with other 
8 
 
farmers, or allow farm visitors on the farm without proper preventive measures. To 
prevent potential hazards farmers should keep their animals healthy through proper 
nutrition and avoid stress to help build and keep their immunity. When vehicles enter a 
farm they should be disinfected, a farm should be kept clean, and one should be vigilant 
to prevent any potential risks. Farmers must also remember that wildlife can carry 
diseases that can infect livestock (APHIS, 2007). 
According to the USDA in 2006, U.S. agriculture generated over $1 trillion 
annually, including $50 billion in exports. One in every eight Americans worked in some 
area of food production. One disease outbreak in the food production chain can cause 
food prices to go up. Even without agroterrorism, livestock and crop disease cost the U.S. 
economy billions of dollars annually (Schneider, et al, 2009).  If an agroterrorism event 
occurred in the U.S. the potential for disruption to the export markets would be immense. 
International trade is crucial as it provides a market for a major part of our crop 
production, and growing share of meat output. Proportionately, the U.S. agriculture 
industries rely on export markets more heavily than other sectors of the U.S. economy.  
An agroterrorism event that instigated fear or even uncertainty in our international 
customers could be financially devastating to U.S. agriculture interests (Schneider, et al, 
2009). The deliberate introduction of a pathogen into the U.S. livestock, poultry, or crops 
could cause a disease outbreak. Jayarao, Tewari, and Wolfgang (nd.) stated that the 
outcome of an outbreak could be devastating, resulting in the loss of livestock, disruption 
of animal agriculture industry and decreased food production. This would drive food 
prices up, halt valuable exports, and ultimately cost taxpayers billions of dollars in lost 
revenue and industry renewal costs.  
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The recent terrorist attack on the U.S. raised serious concerns on the vulnerability 
of plant and animal agriculture in the U.S. As a result of the detection of only one case of 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in the U.S. in December 2003, most countries 
banned U.S. beef causing the industry to lose between 3.2 and 4.7 billion dollars in 2004. 
Two years later, Japan and South Korea, which together account for over 50 percent of 
beef exports, had not lifted the ban (DHS, 2005). On June 26, 2006 the ban was lifted off 
of the United States, and beef was once again exported to Japan (Clemens, 2007). 
Experts warn that the American food supply system could be a target of a terrorist 
attack. While testifying before the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry on 
July 20, 2005, Mr. John Lewis, Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, stated, “Most people do not equate terrorist attacks with 
agroterrorism. But the threat is real, and the impact could have both severe public health 
and economic consequences, while damaging the public’s confidence in the food we eat.” 
(DHS, 2005). 
According to a March 2005 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report 
entitled “Much is Being Done to Protect Agriculture from a Terrorist Attack, but 
Important Challenges Remain,” Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) 
communication with state and local officials and coordination of federal activities is 
lacking. The GAO reported a lack of communication between DHS and states regarding 
the development of emergency response plans, grant guidance, and best practices. State 
and industry officials reported that there is no mechanism to share lessons learned from 
exercises or real-life animal disease outbreaks. The GAO report also stated that 
shortcomings exist in the Department of Homeland Securities’ federal coordination of 
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national efforts to protect against agroterrorism. The lack of DHS leadership on 
agriculture security can be seen in the June 2004 incident in Washington State where 18 
head of cattle developed chromium contamination. Agroterrorism was suspected, yet 
neither USDA nor DHS were notified for over a week (DHS, 2005). 
  In today’s agriculture industries various trends are present that could potentially 
increase the spread and prevalence of infectious disease in cattle herds (Wolfgang, n.d.). 
The concern regarding infectious diseases spurred by the spread and economic 
devastation wrought by Foot and Mouth Disease in Britain, this is an excellent time to 
reinforce the need for a biosecurity program (Wolfgang, n.d.). 
While biosecurity measures have historically benefited agriculture by reducing 
crop and livestock losses, as well as costs associated with control programs, there have 
also been benefits to human health and the environment through the reduced use of 
pesticides and the exclusion of some invasive alien species (Meyerson & Reaser, 2002). 
Some of the policies and activities undertaken by USDA suggest that the department is 
willing and able to move toward a comprehensive biosecurity approach (Meyerson, & 
Reaser, 2002). 
The U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service’s and the Veterinary Service program maintains a high level of emergency 
preparedness, and provides the needed resources to respond to eliminate disease 
outbreaks in this country. In order to effectively protect against such outbreaks, it will 






 Realization that food security could be an issue in the United States became 
evident after the September 11, 2001 terrorism attack. The goal of biosecurity is to stop 
the transmission of disease causing agents by preventing, minimizing or controlling 
cross-contamination of body fluids between animals, animals to feed and animals to 
equipment that may directly and indirectly contact animals (Buhman, Dewett, & Griffin, 
2007).  While developing and maintaining biosecurity is the cheapest, most effective 
means of disease control available, and no disease prevention program will work without 
it (Buhman, Dewett, & Griffin, 2007).  Which raises the question of how do West 





Problem Statement  
There are 10,653 beef producers in West Virginia.  Unlike the poultry industry 
where biosecurity plans are required for each operation, beef producers are not required 
to have biosecurity plans.  Are West Virginia beef producers aware of biosecurity 
practices, and the impact the lack of biosecurity practices can have on their farms due to 
diseases and potential financial loss? What are West Virginia beef producers’ perceptions 
of the potential for an agroterrorism attack and what biosecurity measures are they 
practicing?   
Purpose of the Study 
 The purpose of the study was to determine West Virginia beef cattle producers’ 
perceptions of their preparedness for an agroterrorism attack. Have they implemented 
biosecurity plans, and to what degree? What is West Virginia beef producers’ level of 
knowledge about recommended biosecurity measures and where do they get their 
information regarding biosecurity practices?   
Objectives of the Study 
The following objectives were used to guide the research:  
1. Identify West Virginia beef producers’ preparedness for an agroterrorism attack. 
2. Identify current biosecurity practices of West Virginia beef producers.  
3. Identify West Virginia beef producers’ perceptions of risk related to bioterrorism 
and agroterrorism. 
4. Identify where West Virginia beef producers’ go for information on biosecurity. 
13 
 
5. Determine West Virginia beef producers’ preferred delivery methods for 
receiving information on bioterrorism and agroterrorism. 
Research Design  
A descriptive research design using a mailed questionnaire was used to determine 
the perceptions of West Virginia beef cattle producers on their preparedness for an 
agroterrorism attack.  A questionnaire was designed to determine what biosecurity 
practices are being implemented by beef producers in West Virginia. According to Ary, 
Jacobs, Razavieh, Sorensen (2006), surveys allow the researcher to measure the attitudes 
and opinions of the respondents to collect information from a sample of the target 
population.    
Population 
The target population of this study was all beef producers in West Virginia. Due 
to the lack of availability of an official list of beef producers for the state of West 
Virginia, the accessible population was selected from a compiled list of participants in the 
Southern Bull Test, Beef Quality Assurance Program, members on the West Virginia 
Cattleman’s Association mailing list, participants in the South Branch and Weston 
livestock markets, and State Livestock Roundup (N =4600). The Krejcie and Morgan 
guidelines (1960) were used to determine the total sample size of producers (n=355). A 
random sample of 355 producers was selected from the list. 
Instrumentation 
Mailed questionnaires were sent to 355 beef producers in West Virginia. The 
instrument had five parts and consisted of 78 questions. The first part of the questionnaire 
consisted of Likert-type questions designed to determine the producers’ perceptions about 
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agroterrorism. Each question had five available responses which were: strongly agree, 
agree, neither agree or disagree, disagree, and strongly disagree. The second part of the 
questionnaire was designed so the producers’ could rate the level of perceived threat for 
various factors, the Likert-type responses included considerable, much, some, little, and 
none. The third section was designed to determine where producers would go to gather 
information on agroterrorism, using multiple choice questions.  Part four was designed to 
assess the importance the producer put on selected safeguards and to what degree they 
practiced the safeguard. The responses provided for the “importance of the safeguard” 
included major, moderate, minor, and no importance.  The responses for “degree to 
which you practice” were always, moderate, rarely, never, and not applicable.  This 
section also sought to determine the likelihood of which individual/agency or published 
information source the producer would contact for additional information about 
agroterrorism livestock specific biosecurity threats. The responses provided included very 
likely, fairly likely, likely, unlikely, and very unlikely.  Part five was designed to collect 
demographic information about the producer and their beef operation.  
Validity 
 The instrument was presented to Livestock Extension Specialists and faculty 
members in the department of Agricultural and Extension Education at West Virginia 
University to establish its content and face validity.  Each individual on the panel had 
extensive teaching or Extension experience.  The panel determined that the instrument 




The reliability of the instrument was established using the final data set. Because 
the data consisted of nominal and ordinal scale responses, the Spearman Brown split half 
statistic was used to establish the instrument’s reliability. The reliability was found to be 
exemplary with the coefficient of .758 (Robinson, Shaver, & Wrightsman, 1991). The 
instrument was established as a reliable measure.  
Data Collection Procedures 
Dillman’s Tailored Design Method (2007) was used to collect data for this study. 
A packet consisting of a cover letter (Appendix A), instrument (Appendix B), and a 
postage paid, self-addressed envelope was mailed to the participants on April 13, 2010 
and was due back on April 28, 2010. A second packet was sent to all non-respondents on 
April 30, 2010. The second mailing consisted of another copy of the instrument, a follow-
up cover letter (Appendix C), and a postage paid, self-addressed envelope.  These 
individuals were given a deadline of May 17, 2010. A post card was sent to West 
Virginia beef producers that did not return a survey before May 17, 2010. 
Analysis of Data 
The data were entered into an Excel spreadsheet.  The data were then transferred 
to SPSS for analysis, and the significance level was set a priori at ≤ .05 for all statistical 
tests.  Descriptive analyses were performed on the data and the appropriate methods of 
reporting each type of data were used. 
Use of Findings 
The findings from this study will be used to draw conclusions about the 
perceptions and preparedness of beef cattle producers in West Virginia with regard to 
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agroterrorism and biosecurity.  The information gathered will be shared with Extension 
personnel, University Animal Science faculty, the State Department of Agriculture and 
beef cattlemen’s association to assist them in the development of educational materials 





Purpose of the Study 
 The purpose of the study was to determine West Virginia beef cattle producers’ 
perceptions of their preparedness for an agroterrorism attack. Have they implemented 
biosecurity plans, and to what degree? What is West Virginia beef producers’ level of 
knowledge about recommended biosecurity measures and where do they get their 
information regarding biosecurity practices?   
Objectives of the Study 
The following objectives were used to guide the research:  
1. Identify West Virginia beef producers’ preparedness for an agroterrorism attack. 
2. Identify current biosecurity practices of West Virginia beef producers.  
3. Identify West Virginia beef producers’ perceptions of risk related to bioterrorism 
and agroterrorism. 
4. Identify where West Virginia beef producers go for information on biosecurity. 
5. Determine West Virginia beef producers’ preferred delivery methods for 
receiving information on bioterrorism and agroterrorism. 
Findings 
The target population for this study consisted of beef producers in West Virginia.  
The sample population of 355 was randomly selected.  Out of the 355 surveys, 16 were 
returned as undeliverable, 5 were returned as deceased, and 7 producers were no longer 
farming making the sample population 327. Out of the 327 questionnaires 156 were 




One hundred and twenty-four (87.3%) respondents were male while 18 (12.7%) 
were female (see Table 1). One hundred and thirty-five (95.1%) respondents had been in 
the beef cattle business for more than seven years. Two (1.4%) beef producers indicated 
they had been in business for 73 months – 7 years, one (.7%) producer had been in 
business for 61 months – 6 years, two (1.4%) respondents had been in business for 49 
months – 5 years, while two (1.4%) have only been in business for 37 months - 4 years 
(see Table 2). 
Table 1 
 
Gender of Participants 
 
Gender N % 
Male 124 87.3 





Years in Beef Cattle Business 
 
N % 
37 months – 4 years 2 1.4 
49 months – 5 years 2 1.4 
61 months – 6 years 1 .7 
73 months – 7 years 2 1.4 
More than 7 years 135 95.1 
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Cattle on Operation 
 Beef producers were asked the size of their beef cattle herd. Twenty-five (17.6%) 
respondents had 1 – 20 animals, 49 (34.5%) had 21 – 50 animals, and 40 (28.2%) had 
51 – 100 animals. Thirteen (9.2%) respondents had 101 – 200 animals, 10 (7.0%) had 
201 – 300 animals, three (2.1%) had 301 – 500 animals, and two (1.4%) had 500 or more 
animals on their farm (see Table 3). 
Table 3 
 
Cattle on Operation 
 
N % 
1 - 20 animals 25 17.6 
21 – 50 animals 49 34.5 
51 – 100 animals 40 28.2 
101 – 200 animals 13 9.2 
201 – 300 animals 10 7.0 
301 – 500 animals 3 2.1 
501 + animals 2 1.4 
 
Role in Operation 
 Beef producers were asked about their roles on their operations, 124 (87.3%) 
respondents were owner-operators. Eleven (7.7%) respondents indicated they were the 
operator on land they owned, two (1.4%) indicated they were operators on rented-leased 





Role in Operation 
 
N % 
Owner-Operator 124 87.3 
Operator on land you own 11 7.7 
Operator on rented-leased 
land 2 1.4 
Other 5 3.5 
 
Acreage Owned and/or Leased 
Respondents were asked about acres owned or leased. Five (3.5%) beef producers 
indicated they did not own any land and 55 (39.3%) indicated they did not lease any land. 
Forty-six (32.6%) respondents owned land that was less than one acre to 99 acres, while 
26 (18.6%) leased land less than one acre to 99 acres (see Table 5). 
Thirty-five (24.8%) respondents owned 100 – 249 acres and 23 (16.4%) leased 
100 – 249 acres. Thirty (21.3%) beef producers indicated they owned 250 – 499 acres 
and 21 (15%) leased 250 – 499 acres. Seventeen (12.1%) respondents owned 500 – 999 
and eight (5.7%) leased 500 – 999 acres. Six (4.3%) respondents indicated they owned 
1000 – 1999 and four (2.9%) leased 1000 – 1999. Two (1.4%) owned 2000 or more acres 




Acres Owned or Leased 
 
Acres owned Acres leased  
N % N % 
None 5 3.5 55 39.3 
Less than 1 acre to 99 acres 46 32.6 26 18.6 
100 – 249 acres 35 24.8 23 16.4 
250 – 499 acres 30 21.3 21 15.0 
500 – 999 acres 17 12.1 8 5.7 
1000 – 1999 acres 6 4.3 4 2.9 
2000 – or more acres 2 1.4 3 2.1 
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Perceptions and Preparedness for an Agroterrorism Attack 
Beef producers were asked to indicate their perceptions and preparedness of 
agroterrorism. Fifty-three respondents (39.3%) strongly agree that agroterrorism could 
happen in the United States, and 70 (51.9%) agreed. Eighty-one respondents (60.0%) 
agreed that agroterrorism could happen in West Virginia and of the other respondents 18 
(13.3%) agreed.  Twenty-seven respondents (20.5%) agreed that an agroterrorism could 
happen on their farm, and five (3.8%) strongly agreed (see Table 6). 
 Ten respondents (7.4%) neither disagree nor agreed, and two (1.5%) strongly 
disagreed that an agroterrorism attack could happen in the United States (U.S.). Twenty-
three respondents (17.0%) neither disagreed nor agreed, nine (6.7%) disagreed, and four 
(3.0%) strongly disagreed that an agroterrorism attack could happen in West Virginia. 
Fifty-one (38.1%) beef producers neither agreed nor disagreed that agroterrorism could 





Perceptions about Agroterrorism 
 
 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly Agree 
  N % N % N % N % N % 
Agroterrorism in the USA 2 1.5  0 0.0  10 7.4 70 51.9 53 39.3 
Agroterrorism in West Virginia 4 3.0 9 6.7 23 17.0 81 60.0 18 13.3 
Agroterrorism on own farm 20 14.9 27 20.1 51 38.1 34 25.4 2 1.5 
Preparedness for an agroterrorism 




Perceived Threats to Farm  
West Virginia beef producers were asked to rate their level of perceived threat for 
several aspects of their farm.  With regard to potential for water contamination, 46 
(33.6%) respondents indicated that water contamination was of little threat to them. 
Forty-six (33.6%) producers indicated water contamination was some threat, 19 (13.9%) 
considered it much of a threat, 18 (13.1%) indicated it was a considerable threat, but 17 
(12.4%) beef producers said they did not feel that water contamination was a threat (see 
Table 7). 
When asked about feed contamination, 47 (34.3%) respondents indicated they 
perceived feed contamination somewhat of a threat to their farm, while 13 (9.5%) 
perceived it to be much of a threat, and 11 (8.0%) saw it as a considerable threat. Forty-
six (33.6%) respondents indicated that feed contamination was of little threat to their 
farm, while 20 (14.6%) respondents considered feed contamination to be of no threat (see 
Table 7).  
Sixty-five (48.5%) beef producers indicated that the death of an animal was some 
threat on their farm, while, 15 (11.2%) considered it much of a threat, and seven (5.2%) 
reported animal death as a considerable threat to their farm. Thirty-two (23.9%) 
respondents reported that animal death as of little threat, while, 15 (11.2%) respondents 
considered animal death to be no threat on their farm (see Table 7). 
Forty-nine (36.6%) respondents indicated that an animal disease outbreak was 
some threat to their farm, while 22 (16.4%) considered it much of a threat, and 12 (9.2%) 
reported that an animal disease outbreak is a considerable threat to their farm. Thirty-six 
25 
 
(26.9%) respondents replied that an animal disease outbreak is of little threat, while, 15 
(11.2%) considered an animal disease outbreak to be no threat to their farm (see Table 7). 
Forty (29.6%) beef producers felt that fertilizer theft misuse was of little threat to 
their farm, while 56 (41.5%) felt that fertilizer theft misuse was of no threat. Twenty-
seven (20.0%) indicated that fertilizer theft misuse was some threat, nine (6.7%) 
considered it to be much threat, and three (2.2%) reported that fertilizer theft misuse was 
a considerable threat (see Table 7). 
Ninety-two (67.6%) respondents reported that employee revenge was of no threat 
to their farm, 26 (19.1%) considered it to be of little threat, and 10 (7.4%) responded that 
employee revenge could be of some threat to their farm. Three (2.2%) beef producers 
reported that employee revenge was a considerable threat to their farm, while, five (3.7%) 
felt employee revenge was of much threat to their farm (see Table 7). 
Thirty (22.2%) respondents considered chemical contamination to be some threat 
to their farm, 10 (7.4%) considered chemical contamination was of much threat, and 5 
(3.7%) reported it was a considerable threat. Fifty-four (40.0%) replied that chemical 
contamination was of little threat, while, 36 (26.7%) considered it to be of no threat to 
their farm (see Table 7). 
When asked about Zoonotic illness, 32 (23.9%) indicated they perceived Zoonotic 
illness as somewhat of a threat to their farm, while 55 (41.0%) reported that Zoonotic 
illness was of little threat, and 35 (26.1%) perceived it to be no threat. Seven (5.2%) 
respondents indicated that Zoonotic illness was much of a threat to their farm, while 5 
(3.7%) felt it was a considerable threat (see Table 7). 
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When respondents were asked about loss of income due to market loss, 35 (25.7%) 
perceived it as a considerable threat, while 16 (11.8%) reported it as no threat. Twenty-
two (16.2%) respondents reported that loss of income due to market loss was much of a 
threat, 34 (25.0%) indicated it as somewhat of a threat, but 29 (21.3%) considered it to be 
of little threat to their farm (see Table 7). 
Thirty-four (25.2%) respondents considered tampering with facilities somewhat 
of a threat to their farm, while 15 (11.1%) perceived it was much of a threat, and 12 
(8.9%) indicated it was a considerable threat. Forty (29.6%) respondents felt tampering 
with facilities was of little threat and 34 (25.2%) did not feel that it was any threat at all 
(see Table 7). 
Respondents were asked about the threat of people tampering with fences/gates, 
and 36 (26.5%) responded it was somewhat of a threat to their farm. Twenty-seven 
(19.9%) considered that the threat of tampering with fences/gates as much of a threat and 
19 (14.0%) felt it was a considerable threat. Twenty-nine (21.3%) respondents indicated 
they felt tampering with fences/gates was of little threat to their farm, while, 25 (18.4%) 





Perceived Level of Threat 
 
 None Little Some Much Considerable 
 N % N % N % N % N % 
Water contamination 17 12.4 37 27.0 46 33.6 19 13.9 18 13.1 
Feed contamination 20 14.6 46 33.6 47 34.3 13 9.5 11 8.0 
Animal death 15 11.2 32 23.9 65 48.5 15 11.2 7 5.2 
Animal disease outbreak 15 11.2 36 26.9 49 36.6 22 16.4 12 9.0 
Fertilizer theft-misuse 56 41.5 40 29.6 27 20.0 9 6.7 3 2.2 
Employee revenge 92 67.6 26 19.1 10 7.4 5 3.7 3 2.2 
Chemical contamination 36 26.7 54 40.0 30 22.2 10 7.4 5 3.7 
Zoonotic illness 35 26.1 55 41.0 32 23.9 7 5.2 5 3.7 
Loss of income due to market loss 16 11.8 29 21.3 34 25.0 22 16.2 35 25.7 
Tampering with facilities 34 25.2 40 29.6 34 25.2 15 11.1 12 8.9 
Tampering with fences-gates 25 18.4 29 21.3 36 26.5 27 19.9 19 14.0 
Other 9 60.0 1 6.7 1 6.7 1 6.7 3 20.0 
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Attended Workshop on Biosecurity-Agroterrorism 
 West Virginia beef producers were asked if they had ever attended a workshop on 
biosecurity-agroterrorism. Twenty-eight (20.6%) beef producers said they have attended 
a biosecurity-agroterrorism workshop at least once, 11 (8.1%) more than once, and 97 




Attended Workshop on Biosecurity-Agroterrorism 
 
  N % 
Yes, at least once 28 20.6 
More than once 11 8.1 
No 97 71.3 
 
Where Producers would Seek Advice in Event of an Act of Agroterrorism 
Respondents were asked from whom they would seek advice if they suspected an 
act of agroterrorism had occurred on their farm. Seventy-one (51.1%) respondents 
indicated they would contact a veterinarian, while, 59 (42.8%) beef producers indicated 
they would call an Extension agent (see Table 7).  The West Virginia Department of 
Agriculture (WVDA) was who 73 of the respondents (52.9%) indicated they would call.  
Twenty-two (15.9%) respondents indicated they would contact another livestock 
producer, while, 87 (63.0%) respondents indicated they would contact law enforcement 
about an importance on agroterrorism attack. Seventeen (12.3%) beef producers reported 
they would contact the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) for advice on 
agroterrorism (see Table 9). 
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Five (3.6%) West Virginia beef producers would contact a producer association, 
while, six (4.3%) would seek advice from state emergency management. Eleven (8.0%) 
respondents reported they would contact the county emergency management for advice in 
agroterrorism, nine (6.5%) respondents indicated they would seek advice from Homeland 
Security, while, eight (5.8%) indicated they would not know who to contact for advice 




Where Producers would Seek Advice in Event of an Act of Agroterrorism 
 
No Yes 
N % N % 
Veterinarian 68 48.9 71 51.1 
Extension Agent 79 57.2 59 42.8 
WV Department of Agriculture 65 47.1 73 52.9 
Another livestock producer 116 84.1 22 15.9 
Law enforcement 51 37.0 87 63.0 
USDA 121 87.7 17 12.3 
Producer Association 133 96.4 5 3.6 
State Emergency Management 132 95.7 6 4.3 
County Emergency 
Management 127 92.0 11 8.0 
Homeland Security 129 93.5 9 6.5 
Don't know 130 94.2 8 5.8 




West Virginia beef producers were asked if they had made considerable 
investments since September 11, 2001 to make their operation more biosecure. Three 
(2.2%) respondents indicated they have made considerable investments to make their 
operation more secure before September 11, 2001, 15 (11.0%) made considerable 
investments after September 11, while, nine (6.6%) indicated they made investments 
before and after September 11, 2001. One hundred and three (75.7%) of the respondents 
indicated that the attack on the United States in September 2001 had no influence on their 
investments to make their operation more secure and six (4.4%) did not know if they 
made any investments for security purposes since the September 2001 attack on the U.S 
(see Table 10).  
Table 10 
 
Investments Made to Make Operation More Secure 
 
N % 
Yes, before September 11, 2001 3 2.2 
Yes, before and after September 11, 2001 9 6.6 
Yes, after September 11, 2001 15 11.0 
No 103 75.7 
Don't know 6 4.4 
 
Importance of Biosecurity Safeguards 
The participants were asked about the importance of a biosecurity safeguards and 
the degree to which each is practiced on their farm. Fourteen (11.0%) respondents 
indicated limiting visitors was a safeguard of major important to their farm, 40 (31.5%) 
responded limiting visitors was of moderate importance to their farm, and 51 (41.2%) 
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reported it was of minor importance, while 22 (17.3%) respondents indicated that limiting 
visitors was of no importance to their farm. Eight (6.3%) respondents reported they 
always practice limiting visitors on their farm, 29 (22.7%) indicated they moderately 
practice limiting visitors, 39 (30.5%) indicated they rarely practice limiting visitors, 36 
(28.1%) never practice limiting visitors, while, 16 (12.5%) indicated that limiting visitors 
to their farm was not applicable (see Table 11).  
Eleven (8.8%) respondents indicated it was of major importance to require a 
waiting period for visitors from other farms, 32 (25.6%) reported it was of moderate 
importance, and 45 (36.0%) responded it was of minor importance. Thirty-seven (29.6%) 
indicated that requiring a waiting period for visitors from other farms is of no importance. 
Six (4.6%) respondents reported they always practice having a waiting period for visitors 
from other farms, 15 (11.5%) indicated they moderately practice waiting periods, 30 
(23.1%) rarely practiced waiting periods, while, 56 (43.1%) never practice waiting 
periods for visitors from other farms and 23 (17.7%) indicated it was not applicable to 
their farm (see Table 11). 
Sixty-nine (54.8%) respondents indicated they feel it is of major importance to 
isolate a new animal before introducing it to an existing herd, 39 (31.0%) respondents felt 
it was of moderate importance, and 10 (7.8%) felt it was of minor importance. Eight 
(6.23%) respondents felt it is of no importance to isolate new animals before introducing 
them to the existing herd. Sixty-four (49.2%) beef producers reported they always 
practice isolating new animals before introducing them to the existing herd, 36 (27.7%) 
moderately practice isolating new animals, 15 (11.5%) rarely practice isolating new 
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animals, and eight (6.2%) never practice, while seven (5.4%) indicated it was not 
applicable to their farm (see Table 11). 
Seven (5.8%) respondents indicated it is of major importance to require 
employees to wear overalls, 23 (19.2%) respondents felt it was of moderate importance 
for employees to wear overalls, and 36 (30.0%) felt it was of minor importance. Fifty-
four (45.0%) respondents felt it was not important to require employees to wear overalls. 
Five (3.9%) respondents indicated they always require employees to wear overalls, seven 
(5.4%) respondents indicate they moderately require their employees to wear overalls, 18 
(14.0%) rarely require their employees to wear overalls, and 48 (37.2%) never require 
their employees to wear overalls, while, 51 (39.5%) felt it was not applicable to their 
farm (see Table 11). 
Seven (5.8%) respondents indicated it is of major importance for their employees 
to wear shoe covers, 27 (22.5%) respondents indicate employees wearing shoe covers is 
of moderate importance, and 31 (25.8%) felt it is of minor importance. Fifty-five (45.8%) 
respondents felt it is of no importance to have employees wear shoe covers. Four (3.1%) 
respondents reported they always practice making employees wear shoe covers, eight 
(6.2%) respondents moderately practice, 14 (10.8%) respondents indicated they rarely 
practice employees wearing shoe covers, and 52 (40.0%) never have their employees 
wear shoe covers, while 52 (40.0%) indicated it was not applicable to their farm (see 
Table 11). 
Nine (7.4%) respondents indicated it was of major importance to have visitors use 
a footbath, 26 (21.3%) respondents indicated it was of moderate importance, and 41 
(33.6%) felt it was of minimal importance. Forty-six (37.7%) respondents felt it was of 
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no importance to require visitors to use footbaths. One (.8%) respondent indicated they 
always require visitors to use footbaths, 5 (3.9%) respondents moderately require 
footbaths, 13 (10.2%) respondents rarely require footbaths, 73 (57.0%) never require 
footbaths and 36 (28.1%) felt using footbaths was not applicable to their farm (see Table 
11). 
Five (4.2%) respondents indicated it was of major importance for employees to 
use footbaths, 22 (18.6%) respondents indicated it was of moderate importance, and 37 
(31.4%) felt it was of minor importance for employees to use footbaths. Fifty-four 
(45.8%) respondents felt it was of no importance to require employees to use footbaths. 
One (.8%) respondent reported they always require employees to use footbaths, three 
(2.3%) reported they moderately require employees to use footbaths, 11 (8.6%) rarely 
require their employees to use footbaths, and 60 (46.9%) indicated they never require 
employees to use footbaths, while, 53 (41.4%) felt requiring employees to use footbaths 
was not applicable to their farm (see Table 11). 
Five (4.2%) respondents indicated it is of major importance that they require their 
visitors to wear gloves, 19 (16.0%) respondents felt it was of moderate importance, and 
39 (32.8%) felt it is of minor importance. Fifty-six (47.1%) respondents felt it is of no 
importance to require visitors to wear gloves. Two (1.6%) respondents always require 
visitors to wear gloves, eight (6.3%) respondents indicated they moderately require 
visitors to wear gloves, 15 (11.9%) respondents rarely require visitors to wear gloves.  
Sixty-two respondents (49.2%) never require visitors to wear gloves and 39 (31.0%) felt 
requiring visitors to wear gloves is not applicable to their farm (see Table 11). 
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Seven (6.1%) respondents indicated it is of major importance for employees to 
wear gloves, 26 (22.8%) indicated it is of moderate importance, and 34 (29.8%) felt it is 
of minor importance. Forty-seven (41.2%) respondents felt it is of no importance for 
employees to wear gloves. Three (2.3%) respondents always require their employees to 
wear gloves, 18 (14.1%) respondents moderately require their employees to wear gloves, 
10 (7.8%) respondents rarely require their employees to wear gloves, and 51 (39.8%) 
never require gloves to be worn by their employees, while 46 (35.9%) indicated requiring 
employees to wear gloves is not applicable to their farm (see Table 11). 
Ten (8.3%) respondents indicated it was of major importance to require visitors to 
stop at a biosecurity checkpoint before entering the farm, 21 (17.5%) indicated it is of 
moderate importance and 26 (21.7%) felt it was of minor importance to have visitors to 
stop at a biosecurity checkpoint when entering the farm. Sixty-three (52.5%) respondents 
feel that it was of no importance for requiring visitor to stop at a biosecurity checkpoint 
when entering the farm. One (.8%) respondent indicated they always have visitors to stop 
at a biosecurity checkpoint when entering the farm, four (3.2%) respondents moderately 
require visitors to stop at a biosecurity checkpoint, nine (7.1%) respondents indicated 
they rarely require visitors to stop at a biosecurity checkpoint, and 68 (54.0%) never 
require visitors to stop at a biosecurity checkpoint when they enter the farm, while 44 
(34.9%) felt it was not applicable to their farm (see Table 11). 
 Two (1.7%) respondents indicated it is of major importance to require people 
entering the farm to shower, seven (5.9%) respondents indicated it was of moderate 
importance, and 27 (22.9%) felt it was of minor importance. Eighty-two (69.5%) 
respondents felt it was of no importance to have people shower before entering the farm. 
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There were no respondents that felt they always or moderately required people to shower 
before entering their farm, four (3.2%) respondents rarely required people to shower 
before entering the farm, while, 72 (57.1%) never require people to shower before 
entering the farm, while 50 (39.7%) felt it was not applicable to their farm (see Table 11). 
 Two (1.7%) respondents indicated it is of major importance to require people to 
shower before leaving their farm, eight (6.7%) respondents indicated it was of moderate 
importance, and 27 (22.7%) indicated it is of minor importance to require people to 
shower before leaving the farm. Eighty-two (68.9%) respondents felt it was of no 
importance for people to shower before leaving the farm (see Table 9).  None of the 
respondents always require people to shower before leaving their farm, two (1.6%) 
respondents moderately practice requiring people to shower before leaving their farm, 
three (2.4%) rarely require showers before leaving and 71 (56.8%) never require visitors 
to shower before leaving the farm, while 49 (39.2%) indicated it was not applicable to 
their farm (see Table 11). 
 Seven (6.0%) respondents indicated it is of major importance to require visitors to 
disinfect vehicles before entering the farm, 13 (11.2%) respondents indicated it is of 
moderate importance, and 23 (19.8%) indicated it was of minor importance. Seventy-
three (62.9%) respondents felt it was of no importance for visitors to disinfect their 
vehicles before entering the farm. Three (2.4%) respondents indicated they always 
require visitors to disinfect their vehicle, two (1.6%) respondents indicated they 
moderately require visitors to disinfect their vehicle, seven (5.5%) respondents rarely 
require visitors to disinfect their vehicles, and 67 (52.8%) never require visitors to 
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disinfect their vehicles, while, 48 (37.8%) felt it was not applicable to their operation (see 
Table 11). 
 Nineteen (17.3%) respondents indicated it is of major importance to conduct a 
background check on potential hires, 23 (20.9%) respondents indicated it is of moderate 
importance, and 18 (16.4%) felt it is of minor importance. Fifty (45.5%) respondents 
indicated it is of no importance to require a background check on potential hires. Six 
(4.8%) respondents indicated they always practice a background check on potential hires, 
10 (8.0%) respondents indicated they moderately required a background check, eight 
(6.4%) respondents indicated they rarely perform background checks on potential hires, 
and 41 (32.8%) never require a background check, while 60 (48.0%) indicated 
background checks were not applicable to their farm (see Table 11). 
 Nineteen (17.4%) respondents indicated it is of major importance they schedule 
regular meetings with their employees to determine their levels of satisfaction, 22 (20.2%) 
respondents indicated it is of moderate importance, and 19 (17.4%) felt it is of minor 
importance. Forty-nine (45.0%) respondents indicated it was of no importance for regular 
schedule meeting to determine levels of satisfaction. Four (3.2%) respondents indicated 
they always have meetings with their employees to determine levels of satisfaction, 14 
(11.1%) respondents moderately require scheduled meetings, 10 (7.9%) respondents 
rarely require scheduled meetings to determine the levels of satisfaction, and 34 (27.0%) 
never require scheduled meetings, while, 64 (50.8%) indicated it was not applicable to 
their farm (see Table 11). 
 Twenty-five (22.5%) respondents indicated it is of major importance to have a 
training program that will enable employees to quickly recognize or report a disease that 
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happens on the farm, 31 (27.9%) respondents indicated it is of moderate importance, and 
15 (13.5%) felt it was if minor importance. Forty (36.0%) respondents indicated it is of 
no importance to have a training program that will enable employees to quickly recognize 
or report a disease that happens on the farm. Six (4.7%) respondents indicated they 
always require a training program that will enable employees to quickly recognize or 
report a disease that happens on the farm, 24 (18.9%) respondents moderately require 
training programs, 8 (6.3%) respondents rarely require training programs for their 
employees, and 33 (26.0%) never require trainings for their employees on recognizing 






Importance and Practicing of Safeguards on Farm 
 



















 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Limiting visitors 22 17.3 51 40.2 40 31.5 14 11.0 16 12.5 36 28.1 39 30.5 29 22.7 8 6.3
Requiring a waiting 
period for visitors  37 29.6 45 36.0 32 25.6 11 8.8 23 17.7 56 43.1 30 23.1 15 11.5 6 4.6
Isolating a new  8 6.3 10 7.9 39 31.0 69 54.8 7 5.4 8 6.2 15 11.5 36 27.7 64 49.2
Requiring employees 
to wear overalls 54 45.0 36 30.0 23 19.2 7 5.8 51 39.5 48 37.2 18 14.0 7 5.4 5 3.9
Requiring employees 
to wear shoe covers 55 45.8 31 25.8 27 22.5 7 5.8 52 40.0 52 40.0 14 10.8 8 6.2 4 3.1
Requiring visitors to 
use footbaths 46 37.7 41 33.6 26 21.3 9 7.4 36 28.1 73 57.0 13 10.2 5 3.9 1 .8
Requiring employees 
to use footbaths 54 45.8 37 31.4 22 18.6 5 4.2 53 41.4 60 46.9 11 8.6 3 2.3 1 .8
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Table 11 (Continued) 
 
Importance and Practicing of Safeguards on Farm 
 



















 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Requiring visitors to 
stop at a biosecurity 
checkpoint  63 52.5 26 21.7 21 17.5 10 8.3 44 34.9 68 54.0 9 7.1 4 3.2 1 .8
Requiring visitors to 
wear gloves 56 47.1 39 32.8 19 16.0 5 4.2 39 31.0 62 49.2 15 11.9 8 6.3 2 1.6
Requiring employees 
to wear gloves 47 41.2 34 29.8 26 22.8 7 6.1 46 35.9 51 39.8 10 7.8 18 14.1 3 2.3
Requiring people 
entering the farm to 
shower  82 69.5 27 22.9 7 5.9 2 1.7 50 39.7 72 57.1 4 3.2 0 .0 0 .0
Requiring people 
leaving the farm to 
shower  82 68.9 27 22.7 8 6.7 2 1.7 49 39.2 71 56.8 3 2.4 2 1.6 0 .0
Requiring visitors to 
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Importance and Practicing of Safeguards on Farm 
 



















 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Conducting 
background checks 
on potential hires 50 45.5 18 16.4 23 20.9 19 17.3 60 48.0 41 32.8 8 6.4 10 8.0 6 4.8
Have regular 
meetings with 
employees  49 45.0 19 17.4 22 20.2 19 17.4 64 50.8 34 27.0 10 7.9 14 11.1 4 3.2
Training program(s) 
for employees to a 




Likelihood Producer would Contact an Individual/Agency for Additional 
Information about Agroterrorism  
 Respondents were asked what was the likelihood they would contact an 
individual/agency for additional information about agroterrorism, 59 (42.4%) felt they 
would very likely contact a veterinarian. Twenty-three (16.5%) respondents indicated it 
was fairly likely they would contact a veterinarian, 35 (25.2%) were likely to contact a 
veterinarian, but 19 (13.7%) respondents were unlikely to contact a veterinarian and three 
(2.2%) beef producers reported they were very unlikely to contact a veterinarian for an 
agroterrorism information (see Table 12).   
Fifty-nine (42.4%) respondents felt they were very likely to contact an Extension 
agent, while, 23 (16.5%) indicated they were fairly likely to contact an Extension agent. 
Thirty-five (22.2%) respondents were likely to contact an Extension agent, 19 (13.7%) 
indicated they were unlikely to contact Extension personnel, and nine (2.2%) were very 
unlikely to contact an Extension agent (see Table 12). 
 Fifty-six (41.2%) respondents indicated they would very likely contact the West 
Virginia Department of Agriculture (WVDA) for information on agroterrorism and 
biosecurity, while, 25 (18.4%) respondents were fairly likely to contact the WVDA. Forty 
(29.4%) respondents indicated they would likely contact WVDA, 10 (7.4%) indicated 
they were unlikely to contact WVDA, and five (3.7%) were very unlikely to contact 
WVDA (see Table 12). 
 Twenty-nine (21.5%) respondents indicated they would very likely contact 
another livestock producer, while, 32 (23.7%) respondents were fairly likely to contact 
another livestock producer. Forty-six (34.1%) indicated they were likely to contact 
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another livestock producer, while, 18 (13.3%) respondents were unlikely to contact 
another livestock producer, and 10 (7.4%) were very unlikely to contact another livestock 
producer (see Table 12). 
 Fifty (36.8%) respondents indicated they would very likely to contact law 
enforcement for information on agroterrorism and biosecurity, while, 20 (14.7%) 
respondents were fairly likely to contact law enforcement. Thirty-two 32 (23.5%) 
respondents were likely to contact law enforcement, while, 20 (14.7%) were unlikely to 
contact law enforcement, and 14 (10.3%) were very unlikely to contact law enforcement 
(see Table 12). 
 Thirty-four (25.2%) respondents indicated they would very likely contact the 
United Sates Department of Agriculture (USDA), while, 22 (16.3%) respondents would 
fairly likely contact the USDA. Thirty-six (26.7%) respondents were likely to contact the 
USDA, while, 31 (23.0%) respondents were unlikely to contact USDA, and 12 (8.9%) 
were very unlikely to contact USDA (see Table 12). 
 Thirteen (9.9%) respondents indicated they were very likely to contact a producer 
association for information on agroterrorism and biosecurity, while, 15 (11.5%) 
respondents were fairly likely to contact a producer association. Thirty-seven (28.2%) 
respondents were likely to contact a producer association, while, 43 (32.8%) respondents 
indicated they were unlikely to contact a producer association, and 23 (17.6%) were very 
unlikely to contact a producer association (see Table 12). 
 Eleven (8.5%) respondents indicated they were very likely to contact county and 
state emergency management, while, 17 (13.2%) respondents were fairly likely to contact 
to county and state emergency management. Thirty-seven (28.7%) respondents were 
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likely to contact county and state emergency management, while, 41 (31.8%) were 
unlikely to contact county and emergency management, and 23 (17.8%) were very 
unlikely contact county and emergency management (see Table 12). 
 Eight (6.0%) respondents were very likely to contact Homeland Security about 
agroterrorism and biosecurity, while, 14 (10.5%) respondents indicated they were fairly 
likely to contact Homeland Security. Twenty-seven (20.3%) respondents were likely to 
contact Homeland Security, while, 51(38.3%) were unlikely to contact Homeland 
Security, and 33 (24.8%) were very unlikely to contact Homeland Security (see Table 12). 
 Five (3.8%) respondents indicated they would very likely contact state emergency 
management for information on agroterrorism and biosecurity, while, 13 (9.8%) 
respondents indicated they were fairly likely. Thirty-five (26.5%) respondents were likely 
to contact state emergency management, while, 49 (37.1%) indicated they were unlikely 
to contact state emergency management, and 30 (22.7%) were very unlikely to contact 
state emergency management (see Table 12). 
 Five (3.8%) respondents indicated they were very likely to contact county 
emergency management for information on agroterrorism and biosecurity, while, 10 
(7.6%) respondents indicated they were fairly likely. Thirty-six (27.5%) respondents 
indicated they were likely to contact county emergency management, while 50 (38.2%) 
indicated they were unlikely, and 30 (22.9%) were very unlikely to contact county 
emergency management (see Table 12). 
 Nine (6.8%) respondents indicated they were very likely to contact Farm Bureau 
for information on agroterrorism and biosecurity, while, 19 (14.3%) respondents were 
fairly likely to contact Farm Bureau. Forty-eight (36.1%) respondents were likely to 
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contact Farm Bureau, while, 31 (23.3%) indicated they were unlikely, and 26 (19.5%) 
were very unlikely to contact Farm Bureau (see Table 12). 
 Eleven (8.3%) respondents indicated they were very likely to contact the West 
Virginia Beef Council (WVBC) for information on agroterrorism and biosecurity, while, 
14 (10.6%) respondents were fairly likely to contact WVBC. Thirty-four (25.8%) 
respondents indicated they were likely to contact WVBC, while, 45 (34.1%) indicated 
they were unlikely, and 28 (21.2%) were unlikely to contact the WVBC (see Table 12). 
 Eighteen (13.3%) respondents indicated they were very likely to contact the West 
Virginia Beef Cattle Association (WVBCA) for information on agroterrorism and 
biosecurity, while, 20 (14.8%) respondents were fairly likely. Thirty-seven (27.4%) 
respondents were likely to contact WVBCA, while, 38 (28.1%) indicated they were 
unlikely, and 22 (16.3%) were very unlikely to contact WVBCA (see Table 12). 
 Six (4.5%) respondents indicated they were very likely to contact agriculture 
teachers for information on agroterrorism and biosecurity, while, six (4.5%) respondents 
were fairly likely. Twenty-nine (21.6%) respondents were likely to contact agriculture 
teachers, while, 60 (44.8%) indicated they were fairly unlikely, and 33 (24.6%) were very 
unlikely to contact agriculture teachers (see Table 12). 
 Thirteen (9.8%) respondents indicated they were very likely to contact the West 
Virginia beef specialist for information on agroterrorism and biosecurity, while, 16 
(12.0%) respondents were fairly likely. Thirty-nine (29.3%) respondents indicated they 
were likely to contact the WV beef specialist, while, 45 (33.8%) indicated they were 




 Eight (6.0%) respondents indicated they were very likely to contact the West 
Virginia University Davis College of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Design for 
information on agroterrorism and biosecurity, while, 12 (9.0%) respondents were fairly 
unlikely. Thirty-six (27.1%) respondents were likely to contact the West Virginia 
University Davis College of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Design, while, 50 
(37.6%) indicated they were unlikely, and 27 (20.3%) were very unlikely to contact the 
West Virginia University Davis College of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Design 
(see Table 12). 
 Four (3.0%) respondents indicated they were very likely to contact Potomac State 
College (PSC) for information about agroterrorism and biosecurity, while, three (2.3%) 
respondents were fairly likely to contact PSC. Seventeen (12.9%) respondents were likely 
to contact PSC. Sixt-eight (51.5%) indicated they were unlikely to contact PSC, and 40 
(30.3%) were very unlikely to contact PSC (see Table 12). 
 Six (17.6%) respondents indicated they were not very likely to know who to 
contact about agroterrorism and biosecurity, while, two (5.9%) respondents were fairly 
likely not to know who to contact. Seven (20.6%) respondents indicated they were likely 
not to know who to contact, while, nine (26.5%) indicated they were unlikely to know 
who to contact, and 10 (29.4%) were very unlikely to know who to contact (see Table 12).  
 One (14.3%) respondent indicated they were fairly likely to contact others about 
agroterrorism and biosecurity. One (14.3%) respondent indicated they were likely to 
contact others, while, 5 (71.4%) were very unlikely to contact others. Respondents felt 





Likelihood of Contacting Individual or Agency 
 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Likely Fairly Likely Very Likely 
N % N % N % N % N % 
Veterinarian 3 2.2 19 13.7 35 25.2 23 16.5 59 42.4 
Extension agent 9 6.5 16 11.6 50 36.2 24 17.4 39 28.3 
West Virginia Dept. of 
Agriculture 5 3.7 10 7.4 40 29.4 25 18.4 56 41.2 
Another livestock 
producer 10 7.4 18 13.3 46 34.1 32 23.7 29 21.5 
Law enforcement 14 10.3 20 14.7 32 23.5 20 14.7 50 36.8 
United States 
Department of 
Agriculture 12 8.9 31 23.0 36 26.7 22 16.3 34 25.2 
Producer Association 23 17.6 43 32.8 37 28.2 15 11.5 13 9.9 
State or County 
Emergency 




Table 12 (Continued) 
 
Likelihood of Contacting Individual or Agency 
 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Likely Fairly Likely Very Likely 
N % N % N % N % N % 
Homeland Security 33 24.8 51 38.3 27 20.3 14 10.5 8 6.0 
State Emergency 
Management 30 22.7 49 37.1 35 26.5 13 9.8 5 3.8 
County Emergency 
Management 30 22.9 50 38.2 36 27.5 10 7.6 5 3.8 
Farm Bureau 26 19.5 31 23.3 48 36.1 19 14.3 9 6.8 
West Virginia Beef 
Council 28 21.2 45 34.1 34 25.8 14 10.6 11 8.3 
West Virginia Beef 
Cattleman's 
Association 22 16.3 38 28.1 37 27.4 20 14.8 18 13.3 
Agriculture Teachers 33 24.6 60 44.8 29 21.6 6 4.5 6 4.5 
West Virginia Beef 




Table 12 (Continued) 
 
Likelihood of Contacting Individual or Agency 
 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Likely Fairly Likely Very Likely 
N % N % N % N % N % 
West Virginia 
University 27 20.3 50 37.6 36 27.1 12 9.0 8 6.0 
Potomac State College 40 30.3 68 51.5 17 12.9 3 2.3 4 3.0 
Don't know who I 
would contact 10 29.4 9 26.5 7 20.6 2 5.9 6 17.6 
Other, please specify 5 71.4 0 .0 1 14.3 1 14.3 0 .0 
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Access to Education Material to Answer Beef Cattle Biosecurity Questions  
Respondents were asked if they had access to educational materials which could 
be used in answering their beef cattle biosecurity questions. Thirty-four (25.8%) 
responded that they would have access to education materials, 70 (53.0%) indicated they 
would not have access to any educational materials to help answer their beef cattle 
biosecurity questions, while, 28 (21.2%) reported they did not know whether they would 




Access to Educational Material to Answer Beef Cattle Biosecurity Questions 
 
 N % 
Yes 34 25.8 
No 70 53.0 
Don't Know 28 21.2 
 
Use of Published Sources for Additional Information about Agroterrorism  
 Respondents were asked to indicate the likelihood of using various published 
sources for information about agroterrorism and biosecurity. Fifty (36.2%) respondents 
indicated they were very likely to use a farm magazine for information on agroterrorism 
and biosecurity, 26 (18.8%) respondents were fairly likely, and 45 (32.6%) indicated they 
were likely to use a farm magazine for information, while, 11 (8.0%) were unlikely, and 
six (4.3%) were very unlikely to use a farm magazine for information (see Table 14).  
 Twenty-seven (20.0%) respondents indicated they were very likely to read a 
newspaper for information on agroterrorism and biosecurity, while, 24 (17.8%) would 
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fairly likely read a newspaper. Forty-two (31.1%) respondents indicated they were likely 
to read a newspaper for information on agroterrorism, while, 30 (22.2%) indicated they 
were unlikely, and 12 (8.9%) were very unlikely to read a newspaper for information on 
agroterrorism (see Table 14).  
Twenty-six (19.4%) respondents indicated they were very likely to use the 
Internet to find information on agroterrorism and biosecurity, while, 28 (20.9%) 
respondents indicated they were fairly likely. Thirty (22.4%) were likely, while, 19 
(14.2%) indicated they were unlikely, and 31 (23.1%) were very unlikely to use the 
Internet to find information on agroterrorism and biosecurity (see Table 14). 
Two (1.5%) respondents indicated they would very likely read published library 
material to gain knowledge on agroterrorism and biosecurity, while, nine (6.8%) 
respondents indicated they would fairly likely read library materials. Twenty-three 
(17.4%) would likely read published library materials; while, 58 (43.9%) respondents 
were unlikely, and 40 (30.3%) were very unlikely to read published library materials to 
gain knowledge on agroterrorism and biosecurity (see Table 14). 
Forty-four (32.8%) respondents indicate they would very likely go to the 
Extension office to get published materials on agroterrorism and biosecurity, while, 16 
(11.9%) respondents were fairly likely to go the Extension office. Forty-four (32.8%) 
indicated they were likely to go to the Extension office, while, 21 (15.7%) indicated they 
were unlikely, and nine (6.7%) very unlikely go to the Extension office to get published 
materials on agroterrorism and biosecurity (see Table 14). 
Thirty-two (23.9%) respondents indicated they were very likely to go to West 
Virginia University (WVU) for published materials on agroterrorism and biosecurity, 
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while, 23 (17.2%) respondents were fairly likely to contact West Virginia University 
(WVU). Thirty-nine (29.1%) respondents were likely to go to West Virginia University 
(WVU) for published materials on agroterrorism and biosecurity, while, 29 (21.6%) 
indicated they were unlikely to contact WVU, and 11 (8.2%) very unlikely to go to West 
Virginia University (WVU) for published materials on agroterrorism and biosecurity (see 
Table 14). 
Five (45.5%) respondents felt they would very likely find other published material 
on agroterrorism and biosecurity, one (9.1%) felt they were likely to find other materials, 
and five (45.5%) reported it was very unlikely they would find other materials. Other 
published materials respondents felt they would find would be news on television, 
veterinarian, VPI, NCBA, RCALF, USDA, WV Farm Bureau, Market Bulletin, and 



















N % N % N % N % N % 
Farm Magazine 6 4.3 11 8.0 45 32.6 26 18.8 50 36.2 
Newspaper 12 8.9 30 22.2 42 31.1 24 17.8 27 20.0 
Internet (World Wide 
Web) 31 23.1 19 14.2 30 22.4 28 20.9 26 19.4 
Library Publications 40 30.3 58 43.9 23 17.4 9 6.8 2 1.5 
Extension Office 9 6.7 21 15.7 44 32.8 16 11.9 44 32.8 
West Virginia 
University 11 8.2 29 21.6 39 29.1 23 17.2 32 23.9 
Other, please specify: 5 45.5 0 .0 1 9.1 0 .0 5 45.5 
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Impact of Disease Outbreaks 
Beef producers were asked whether or not the Foot and Mouth Disease outbreak 
in England and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) outbreak in the U.S. had any 
influence on them improving security on their farm. Seven (5.2%) respondents indicated 
that the outbreaks had a strong influence on making their farm more secure, while 20 
(14.9%) felt the outbreaks had no influence on their current biosecurity practices. Thirty-
six (26.9%) beef producers indicated that the outbreaks influenced their decision on 
making their operations more secure, but 19 (14.2%) felt the outbreaks had minimal 
influence on their operation. Fifty-two (38.8%) respondents indicated the outbreaks 
neither strongly influenced nor minimally influenced their decisions to make their 
operation more secure (see Table 15). 
Table 15 
 
Extent of Outbreak Influences Decisions Towards Improving Security 
 
 N % 
Strongly Influenced 7 5.2 
Influenced 36 26.9 
Neither 52 38.8 
Minimal Influence 19 14.2 




 Beef producers in West Virginia were asked if they would attend a program about 
agroterrorism-biosecurity. Seventy-seven (54.6%) respondents replied that they would 
attend a program, 17 (12.1%) indicated they would not attend a program on 
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agroterrorism-biosecurity, while, 47 (33.3%) were not sure whether or not they would 




Attend Program about Agroterrorism-Biosecurity 
 
N % 
Yes 77 54.6 
No 17 12.1 
Not Sure 47 33.3 
 
 Respondents were asked when they would prefer an educational program on 
agroterrorism and biosecurity be offered. Ninety-six (78.0%) respondents preferred 
evenings for a  meeting, 16 (13.0%) respondents  preferred weekends, and 11 (8.9%) 
indicated they would attend meetings offered weekdays (see Table 17). 
Table 17 
 
Preferred Delivery Times 
 
N % 
Weekends 16 13.0 
Evenings 96 78.0 
Weekdays 11   8.9 
 
 Respondents were asked what delivery method they would prefer be used in 
delivering information on agroterrorism and biosecurity. Sixty-eight (47.6%) respondents 
indicated they preferred to go to dinner meetings, 61 (42.7%) respondents  preferred 
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printed materials they could read on their own, and 54 (37.8%) indicated  they would like 
to go to trainings (see Table 18). 
Table 18 
 
Preferred Delivery Methods 
 
  N % 
Dinner meetings 68 47.6 
Read printed materials at your own pace 61 42.7 
Trainings 54 37.8 
Demonstrations 43 30.1 
Lectures 30 21.0 
Video-DVD 27 18.9 
Fact sheet 25 17.5 
One-on-One contact 21 14.7 
Books 15 10.5 
Take classes on the Internet 13  9.1 
Group work 12  8.4 
Computer software 8  5.6 
Audio cassettes-CDs 5  3.5 
 
 Forty-three (30.1%) respondents preferred to watch demonstrations, 30 (21.0%) 
indicated a preference for lectures, 27 (18.9%) preferred video-dvds, and 25 (17.5%) 
indicated they would like fact sheets to read. Twenty-one (14.7%) respondents indicated 
they would prefer one-on-one contact, 15 (10.5%) indicated a preference for reading 
books, and 13 (9.1%) indicated they would prefer to take classes on the Internet. Twelve 
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(8.4%) respondents felt they would like group work settings, eight (5.6%) preferred 
computer software, while, five (3.5%) preferred to listen to audio cassette tapes-cd’s (see 
Table 18). 
National Animal Identification 
Beef producers in West Virginia were asked if their farm was registered in the 
animal identification system. Ninety (65.2%) respondents were registered in the national 
animal identification system, 33 (23.9%) were not registered, while, 15 (10.9%) were not 
sure (see Table 19). 
Table 19 
 
Participation in National Animal Identification 
 
  N % 
Yes 90 65.2 
No 33 23.9 
Not sure 15 10.9 
 
 Respondents were asked if they had been through the Beef Quality Assurance 
(BQA) program. Forty-seven (34.1%) had been through the BQA program, 67 (48.6%) 
had not been through the program, and 24 (17.4%) were not sure if they had gone through 





Participation in Beef Quality Assurance Program (BQA) 
 
N % 
Yes 47 34.1 
No 67 48.6 
Not sure 24 17.4 
 
 Respondents were asked how many employees they employed full-time and part-
time in their operation. One hundred and twenty-nine (91.5%) respondents reported they 
did not have any full-time employees, while, 84 (61.8%) did not have any part-time 
employees. Nine (6.4%) respondents had 1 – 2 full-time employees and 46 (33.8%) had1 
- 2 part-time employees. One (.7%) had 3 – 4 fill-time employees and five (3.7%) had 3 – 
4 part-time employees. Two (1.4%) respondents had more than four full-time employees, 
and one (.7%) had more than four part-time employees (see Table 21). 
Table 21 
 
Full-time and Part-time Employees of the Farm 
 
Full-time employees Part-time employees 
  N % N % 
None 129 91.5 84 61.8 
1 – 2 9 6.4 46 33.8 
3 – 4 1   .7 5   3.7 





Summary, Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Purpose of the Study 
 The purpose of the study was to determine West Virginia beef cattle producers’ 
perceptions of their preparedness for an agroterrorism attack. Have they implemented 
biosecurity plans, and to what degree? What is West Virginia beef producers’ level of 
knowledge about recommended biosecurity measures and where do they get their 
information regarding biosecurity practices?   
Objectives of the Study 
The following objectives were used to guide the research:  
1. Identify West Virginia beef producers’ preparedness for an agroterrorism attack. 
2. Identify current biosecurity practices of West Virginia beef producers.  
3. Identify West Virginia beef producers’ perceptions of risk related to bioterrorism 
and agroterrorism. 
4. Identify where West Virginia beef producers go for information on biosecurity. 
5. Determine West Virginia beef producers’ preferred delivery methods for 
receiving information on bioterrorism and agroterrorism. 
Summary 
Three hundred and fifty-five participants were randomly selected from 
participants in the Southern Bull test, Beef Quality Assurance, The West Virginia 
Cattleman’s Association, two livestock markets (Weston and South Branch), and the 
State Livestock Roundup. Mailed questionnaires were sent to the producers, 156 surveys 
out of 355 beef were returned for a response rate of (47.7%). 
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Research Objective One – “Identify West Virginia beef producers’ preparedness for an 
agroterrorism attack.” 
The majority of the respondents were uncertain if they were prepared for an 
agroterrorism attack. Most West Virginia beef producers (75%) felt they did not make 
any considerable investments to make their operations more secure after September 11, 
2001. Beef producers also indicated the previous outbreaks of Foot and Mouth Disease 
and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy had no influence or little influence on their 
biosecurity measures. 
Research Objective Two - “Identify current biosecurity practices of West Virginia beef 
producers.” 
 Most of the West Virginia beef producers agreed that isolating new animals 
before introducing them to the existing herd is of major importance in keeping their farm 
safe. The majority also indicated they always practice isolating new animals. The beef 
producers also agreed that participation in training programs would enable employees to 
quickly report and recognize a disease. 
Research Objective Three - “Identify West Virginia beef producers’ perceptions of risk 
related to bioterrorism and agroterrorism.” 
 A majority of West Virginia beef producers agreed that an agroterrorism attack 
could happen in the United States and in the state of West Virginia, but they were 
uncertain if it would happen on their own farm. West Virginia beef producers were also 
uncertain on their preparedness for an agroterrorism attack. 
 The majority of West Virginia beef producers rated loss of income due to market 
loss as a considerable threat. The next most popular perceived threat was people 
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tampering with the gates and fences. A majority of the farmers did not perceive employee 
revenge as a threat. 
Research Objective Four - “Identify where West Virginia beef producers go for 
information on biosecurity.” 
 Beef producers in West Virginia indicated they would most likely contact law 
enforcement if they suspected an act of agroterrorism. The next individual or agency a 
beef producer would contact was the West Department of Agriculture (WVDA), followed 
by a veterinarian. The majority of the beef producers were very likely to contact all three 
of these agencies or individuals. 
 A majority of the West Virginia beef producers indicated they would very likely 
read a farm magazine to learn information about agroterrorism and biosecurity. The next 
most popular means to gather information would be to contact an Extension agent, 
followed by contacting West Virginia University (WVU).  
Research Objective Five - “Determine West Virginia beef producers’ preferred delivery 
methods for receiving information on agroterrorism.” 
West Virginia beef producers indicated they would most likely attend evening 
meetings for information on agroterrorism, preferably a dinner meeting, followed by 
weekend meetings. The beef producers also indicated a preference to read materials at 
their own pace, and to attend trainings on agroterrorism and biosecurity. 
Discussion 
 The results in West Virginia confirm the findings by DeGraw (2005) who found 
Florida beef producers also have not attended biosecurity workshops. Beef producers in 
West Virginia, like those in Florida, have not made considerable investments regarding 
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security on their operations following the terrorist attacks in the U.S. on September 11, 
2001, or following Foot and Mouth Disease and BSE outbreaks. Beef producers in West 
Virginia and Florida both indicated they would contact law enforcement if they suspected 
an agroterrorism attack on their farm.  
 West Virginia beef producers indicated that the most important safeguard and the 
safeguard most widely practiced on their operation was isolating new animals before 
introducing them to the existing herd. While DeGraw (2005), found that Florida beef 
producers indicated that limiting visitors was their most important safeguard and the one 
safeguard most frequently practiced, while isolating a new animal was second most 
popular safeguard.  
Other similarities between this study and the DeGraw study found that both West 
Virginia and Florida beef producers agreed that an act of agroterrorism could happen in 
the U.S. and could happen on their operation. West Virginia producers indicated they 
were neutral on whether or not they are prepared for an agroterrorism attack to happen on 
their operation, while DeGraw (2005) reported Florida producers do not feel they are 
prepared for an agroterrorism attack to happen on their operation. 
 When sources of information about biosecurity were explored West Virginia beef 
producers indicated they would contact a veterinarian about biosecurity questions, while 
DeGraw found beef producers in Florida would contact the University of Florida. 
However, this study confirms the findings by DeGraw (2004) that beef producers would 
look in a farm magazine for published information on biosecurity. When asked about 
when they prefer trainings, West Virginia producers’ preferred evening, dinner meetings, 
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while DeGraw reports that Florida producers prefer weekend trainings, indicating both do 
not desire week-day programs. 
 This study confirmed many of the findings of DeGraw (2005), even though the 
average herd size between the two states varies greatly. West Virginia producers 
indicating they have 21-50 animals on their operation, whereas DeGraw reported Florida 
producers had 1,000 or more animals on their operation. The difference in herd size does 
not seem to impact beef producers lack of perceived preparedness for a biosecurity attack 
on their farm. Herd size may be more of an indicator of the producers’ perceived threats.  
West Virginia producers with smaller herd sizes, consider loss of income due to market 
loss as a considerable threat. However, DeGraw found those producers in Florida where 
the average herd was 1,000 head; felt that an animal disease outbreak was much of a 
threat to their operation.  
Conclusions 
Based on the results of the study, the following conclusions were made 
1. West Virginia beef producers agree that an agroterrorism attack could happen in 
the United States. 
2. The majority of West Virginia beef producers always practice isolating new 
animals before introducing them to the existing herd. 
3. The majority of West Virginia beef producers have never attended a workshop on 
biosecurity-agroterrorism. 
4. West Virginia beef producers would most likely contact law enforcement for 
advice about agroterrorism. 
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5. West Virginia beef producers have not made considerable investments to make 
their operations more secure.  
6. West Virginia beef producers would prefer a farm magazine to read for published 
information about agroterrorism and biosecurity. 
7. West Virginia beef producers prefer evening trainings, preferably with dinner as a 
method to learn about agroterrorism and biosecurity. 
8. A majority of West Virginia beef producers indicate they would attend a program 
on agroterrorism and biosecurity. 
Recommendations 
The researcher makes the following recommendations based on the results of this study: 
1. Evening/dinner training programs to educate the beef producers on biosecurity 
procedures should be considered. 
2. More information about biosecurity and agroterrorism should be available to beef 
producers in West Virginia. 
3. All beef producers should be encouraged to become Beef Quality Assurance 
(BQA) certified. 
4.  Studies should be conducted on other livestock species in West Virginia to 
determine biosecurity practices and educational needs. 
5. A study should be conducted to determine the availability and accuracy of 
biosecurity information available through various channels. 
6. Homeland Security and Extension should consider writing articles for farm 
magazines on biosecurity measures, since that is the preferred means of securing 
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April 12, 2010 
 
Dear West Virginia Beef Producers: 
 
 As a beef producer you know the importance of keeping your herd safe and free 
of diseases. You have an appreciation for the time and effort that goes into your beef herd. 
Biosecurity is the key to keeping your herd safe. We are interested in the biosecurity 
practices you have implemented on your farm. Please take a few moments and share your 
opinions with us. 
 
I am Rebecca Ours, a graduate student in Agricultural and Extension Education at 
West Virginia University. Under the direction of my advisor, Dr. Deborah Boone, I am 
conducting a research study to determine biosecurity practices currently implemented by 
beef producers. The results of this research study will be used to prepare a thesis to 
partially fulfill the requirements of a Master of Science degree in Agricultural and 
Extension Education. The results will provide insight to other beef producers and 
Extension educators about beef producers’ biosecurity practices. West Virginia 
University’s IRB acknowledgement of this research is on file.  
 
 Participation in this research study, while voluntary, will only take a few minutes 
of your time. You may skip any question you are not comfortable answering or may quit 
at any point and return the partially completed questionnaire. All information will be held 
as confidential as possible. Survey results will be reported in a summary format and 
individual responses will not be identifiable. You will notice a code number on the return 
envelope. This will be used to identify non-respondents for follow up. This code will be 
destroyed before the data are analyzed. There is no penalty and no services will be 
withheld if you choose not to participate. 
 
We thank you in advance for your participation in the study. Please return the 
completed survey by Wednesday April 28, 2010 using the enclosed envelope. For 
questions, you may contact Dr. Boone at debby.boone@mail.wvu.edu or by phone at 
304-293-5450 or Rebecca at rours1@mix.wvu.edu. Thank you, we sincerely appreciate 







Rebecca L. Ours     Deborah A. Boone, Ph.D. 
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Agricultural Security Risks Survey for Beef Producers 
 
Part 1 – Perceptions about Agroterrorism 
 
 Agroterrorism refers to an act of any person knowingly or maliciously using 
biological and/or chemical agents as weapons against the agricultural industry and/or the 
food supply, or using agricultural chemicals and machinery to perform an act of terrorism 
against any segment of the American population.  
 
Instructions:  Using the following Likert scale, rate your opinion on each of the 
following statements.  Indicate your opinion by circling the letters that best corresponds 
to your response:  SA – Strongly Agree, A – Agree, N – Neither Agree or Disagree, D –













































1. I think that an act of agroterrorism could 
happen somewhere in the United States. 
SA A N D SD 
2. I think that an act of agroterrorism could 
happen somewhere in West Virginia. 
SA A N D SD 
3. I think that an act of agroterrorism could 
happen on my operation. 
SA A N D SD 
4. I feel prepared for an agroterrorism 
attack or some other biosecurity threat to 
my operation.  






Part II – Rate the Level of Perceived Threat 
 
Instructions:  Using the following Likert scale, rate the Level of Perceived Threat you 
feel for each aspect of your operation.  Indicate your opinion by circling the number that 
best corresponds to your response:  5 – Considerable threat, 4 – Much  threat, 3 – Some 

























5. Water contamination 5 4 3 2 1 
6. Feed contamination 5 4 3 2 1 
7. Animal death 5 4 3 2 1 
8. Animal disease outbreak 5 4 3 2 1 
9. Fertilizer theft/misuse 5 4 3 2 1 
10. Employee revenge 5 4 3 2 1 
11. Chemical contamination 5 4 3 2 1 
12. Zoonotic illness 
(Disease transmitted from animal to human) 
5 4 3 2 1 
13. Loss of income due to market loss 5 4 3 2 1 
14. Tampering with facilities 5 4 3 2 1 
15. Tampering with fences/gates 5 4 3 2 1 
16. Other, please specify: 
__________________________________ 
 
5 4 3 2 1 
  
 
Part III – Gaining Knowledge about Agroterrorism 
 
17.  Have you attended a workshop or general information session about 
biosecurity/agroterrorism? 
___ a)  Yes, at least once 
___ b)  More than once 




18. If you suspected an act of agroterrorism (or breach of security) on your operation, 
from whom would you seek advice? (Select the three you would most likely 
contact). 
___ a)  Veterinarian 
___ b)  Extension Agent 
___ c)  West Virginia Department of Agriculture 
___ d)  Another livestock producer 
___ e)  Law enforcement 
___ f)  USDA 
___ g)  Producer Association 
___ h)  State Emergency Management 
___ i)  County Emergency Management 
___ j)  Homeland Security 
___ k)  Don’t know 
___ l)  Other (please specify) __________________________________ 
 
19. Have you made considerable investments (time, money or effort) to make your 
operation more biosecure? 
___ a)  Yes, before September 11, 2001 
___ b)  Yes, before and after September 11, 2001 
___ c)  Yes, after September 11, 2001 
___ d)  No 
___ e)  Don’t know 
 <continued on next page> 
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Part IV – Agroterrorism Preparedness 
Below is a list of safeguards that one may practice on the farm in order to reduce the 
likelihood of loss of production due to disease introduction.  
 
Instructions: To the Left, circle the number which represents your opinion of the 
importance of the safeguard to better protect your livestock operation. Indicate your 
opinion by circling the number which best reflects your response: 4 – Major Importance, 
3 – Moderate Importance, 2 – Minor Importance, or 1 – No Importance.  .  
 
To the Right, circle the degree to which you practice the indicated safeguard on your 
livestock operation.  Indicate your opinion by circling the number which best reflects 
your response: 4 – Always Practice, 3 – Moderate Practice, 2 – Rarely Practice, 1 – 
Never Practice, or NA – Not Applicable. 
 
Importance of the 
Safeguard 





















































4 3 2 1 20. Limiting visitors 4 3 2 1 NA
4 3 2 1 
21. Requiring a waiting period for 
visitors who have been on 
another farm 4 3 2 1 NA
4 3 2 1 
22. Isolating a new animal for 
observation before introducing 
it to the entire herd.  4 3 2 1 NA
4 3 2 1 
23. Requiring employees to wear 
overalls  4 3 2 1 NA
4 3 2 1 
24. Requiring employees to wear 







Importance of the 
Safeguard 





















































4 3 2 1 
25. Requiring visitors to use 
footbaths 4 3 2 1 NA
4 3 2 1 
26. Requiring employees to use 
footbaths 4 3 2 1 NA
4 3 2 1 
27. Requiring visitors to wear 
gloves 4 3 2 1 NA
4 3 2 1 
28. Requiring employees to wear 
gloves 4 3 2 1 NA
4 3 2 1 
29. Requiring visitors to stop at a 
biosecurity checkpoint before 
entering the farm 4 3 2 1 NA
4 3 2 1 
30. Requiring people entering the 
farm to shower before entering 4 3 2 1 NA
4 3 2 1 
31. Requiring people leaving the 
farm to shower before leaving 4 3 2 1 NA
4 3 2 1 
32. Requiring visitors to disinfect 
vehicles entering farm 4 3 2 1 NA
4 3 2 1 
33. Conducting a background 
check on potential hires 4 3 2 1 NA
4 3 2 1 
34. Have regular meetings with 
employees to determine levels 
of their satisfaction 4 3 2 1 NA
4 3 2 1 
35. Participate in training 
program(s) that will enable 
employees to quickly recognize 







Instructions:  Using the following Likert scale, rate the likelihood you would contact the 
individual/agency for additional information about agroterrorism or livestock specific 
biosecurity threats. Indicate your opinion by circling the number which best reflects your 






































36. Veterinarian 5 4 3 2 1 
37. Extension agent  5 4 3 2 1 
38. West Virginia Dept. of Agriculture 5 4 3 2 1 
39. Another livestock producer 5 4 3 2 1 
40. Law enforcement 5 4 3 2 1 
41. United States Department of Agriculture 5 4 3 2 1 
42. Producer Association 5 4 3 2 1 
43. State or County Emergency Management 5 4 3 2 1 
44. Homeland Security 5 4 3 2 1 
45. State Emergency Management 5 4 3 2 1 
46.  County Emergence Management 5 4 3 2 1 
47. Farm Bureau  5 4 3 2 1 
48. West Virginia Beef Council 5 4 3 2 1 
49. West Virginia Beef Cattleman’s Association 5 4 3 2 1 
50. Agriculture Teachers 5 4 3 2 1 
51. West Virginia Beef Specialist 5 4 3 2 1 
52. West Virginia University-Davis College of 
Agriculture, Natural Resources and Design 
5 4 3 2 1 






































54. Don’t know who I would contact 5 4 3 2 1 
55. Other, please specify: 
______________________________________ 
 
5 4 3 2 1 
 
56.  Do you have access to educational material that can answer your beef cattle 
biosecurity questions? If you answer “Yes”, please write in the material source in 
the blank space below: 
___ a)  Yes; _________________________________________ 
___ b)  No 








Instructions:  Using the following Likert scale, rate the likelihood you use the following 
sources of published information for additional information about agroterrorism or 
livestock specific biosecurity threats. Indicate your opinion by circling the number which 
best reflects your opinion using: 5 – Very likely, 4 – Fairly likely, 3 – Likely, 2 – 





































57. Farm Magazine 5 4 3 2 1 
58. Newspaper 5 4 3 2 1 
59. Internet (World Wide Web) 5 4 3 2 1 
60. Library Publications 5 4 3 2 1 
61. Extension Office 5 4 3 2 1 
62. West Virginia University 5 4 3 2 1 
63. Other, please specify: 
___________________________ 
 
5 4 3 2 1 
 
 
64. To what extent has the Foot and Mouth outbreak in England and the December 
2003 discovery of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) case in the U.S. 
influenced any decisions towards improving the security on your operation? 
___ a)  Strongly Influenced 
___ b)  Influenced 
___ c)  Neither 
___ d)  Minimal Influence 
___ e)  No Influence 
Part V - Demographics 
65. What is your gender? 
___ a)  Male 
___ b)  Female 
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66. How many years have you been in the beef cattle business? Select one. 
___ a)  1 day – 12 months 
___ b)  13 months – 2 years 
___ c)  25 months – 3 years 
___ d)  37 months – 4 years 
___ e)  49 months – 5years 
___ f)  61 months – 6 years 
___ g)  73 months – 7 years 
___ h)  More than 7 years 
 
67. Please select the number of cattle on your production facility during your peak 
time of the year (when you are at your highest maximum). Select one.   
___ a)  1 – 20 animals 
___ b)  21 – 50 animals  
___ c)  51 – 100 animals 
___ d)  101 – 200 animals 
___ e)  201 – 300 animals 
___ f)  301 – 500 animals  
___ g)  501+ animals 
 
68. How do you describe yourself? 
___ a)  Owner/Operator 
___ b)  Operator on land you own 
___ c)  Operator on rented/leased land 
___ d)  Other (specify) __________________________________ 
69. Would you attend an educational program about agroterrorism/biosecurity?  
___ a)  Yes 
___ b)  No 
___ c)  Not sure 
70. If an educational program were to concentrate on educating beef producers about 
agroterrorism when would prefer delivery method?  
___ a)  Weekends 
___ b)  Evenings 
___ c)  Weekdays 
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71. If an educational program were to concentrate on educating beef producers about 
agroterrorism how would you prefer delivery method? Please select your top 
three choices: 
___ a)  Trainings 
___ b)  Read printed materials at your own pace 
___ c)  Take classes on the Internet 
___ d)  One-on-One contact  
___ e)  Dinner meetings 
___ f)  Demonstrations 
___ g)  Computer software 
___ h)  Lectures 
___ i)  Video/DVD 
___ j)  Audio cassettes/CDs 
___ k)  Group work 
___ l)  Fact sheet 
___ m)  Books 
 
Part V – Operation Demographics 
 
72. How many acres do you own? 
___ a)  None 
___ b)  Less than 1 acre to 99 acres 
___ c)  100 - 249 acres 
___ d)  250 - 499 acres 
___ e)  500 - 999 acres 
___ f)  1000 - 1999 acres 
___ g)  2000 – or more acres 
 
73. How many acres do you rent/lease? 
___ a)  None 
___ b)  Less than 1 acre to 99 acres 
___ c)  100 - 249 acres 
___ d)  250 - 499 acres 
___ e)  500 - 999 acres 
___ f)  1000 - 1999 acres 




74. What is the average value of your annual gross receipts for the beef cattle-related 
segment of your operation? 
___ a)  Less than $9,999 
___ b)  $10,000 - $49,999 
___ c)  $50,000 - $99,000 
___ d)  $100,000 – $249,000 
___ e)  $250,000 – 499, 999 
___ f)  $500,000 - $999,999 
___ g)  $1,000,000 – or more 
 
75. Is your farm registered in the National Animal Identification System? 
___ a)  Yes 
___ b)  No 
___ c)  Not sure 
 
76. Do you have Beef Quality Assurance (BQA) certification? 
___ a)  Yes 
___ b)  No 
___ c)  Not sure 
 
77. How many people do you employ on your farm full time? (other than family) 
___ a)  None 
___ b)  1-2 
___ c)  3-4 
___ d)  More than 4 
78. How many people do you employ on your farm part time? (other than family) 
___ a)  None 
___ b)  1-2 
___ c)  3-4 





































If you have any questions regarding this survey please feel free to contact: 
Rebecca Ours by email: rours1@mix.wvu.edu or 





Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey.  

















April 30, 2010 
 
Dear West Virginia Beef Producers: 
 
 Several weeks ago, you received a survey, seeking input on your opinions 
regarding biosecurity practices as it relates to your beef cattle operation.  Your input is 
vital to this study and your participation is appreciated.  I hope you will take a few 
minutes to fill out the survey and return it in the postage paid envelope. As a beef 
producer you know the importance of keeping your herd safe and free of diseases. You 
have an appreciation for the time and effort that goes into your beef herd. Biosecurity is 
the key to keeping your herd safe. We are interested in the biosecurity practices you have 
implemented on your farm. Please take a few moments and share your opinions with us. 
 
I am Rebecca Ours, a graduate student in Agricultural and Extension Education at 
West Virginia University. Under the direction of my advisor, Dr. Deborah Boone, I am 
conducting a research study to determine biosecurity practices currently implemented by 
beef producers. The results of this research study will be used to prepare a thesis to 
partially fulfill the requirements of a Master of Science degree in Agricultural and 
Extension Education. The results will provide insight to other beef producers and 
Extension educators about beef producers’ biosecurity practices. West Virginia 
University’s IRB acknowledgement of this research is on file.  
 
 Participation in this research study, while voluntary, will only take a few minutes 
of your time. You may skip any question you are not comfortable answering or may quit 
at any point and return the partially completed questionnaire. All information will be held 
as confidential as possible. Survey results will be reported in a summary format and 
individual responses will not be identifiable. You will notice a code number on the return 
envelope.  This will be used to identify non-respondents for follow up. This code will be 
destroyed before the data are analyzed. There is no penalty and no services will be 
withheld if you choose not to participate. 
 
We thank you in advance for your participation in the study. Please return the 
completed survey by Monday, May 17, 2010 using the enclosed envelope. For questions, 
you may contact Dr. Boone at debby.boone@mail.wvu.edu or by phone at 304-293-5450 








Rebecca L. Ours     Deborah A. Boone, Ph.D. 





















Went to WV Beef Expo and no biosecurity measures. Bureaucrats will nothing to help 
small operators if a problem happens except shoot them down and talk endlessly about it. 
Just like this survey, looks good but nothing real will come of it! 
 
For someone to even think that It Is unlikely to have problems In the Food production 
Industry In this Country From terrorists Is Being Foolish. It would Be Very Easy to mess 
up Our Food Supply (meats, Etc.). We must Guard Against this to the Point to have our 
"Guns" Loaded at all Times. WE have already had some problems From Cattle Rustling. 
Since Sept. 11, 2001 Anything can happen. That has Already Been Proven In this 
Country. May God Bless America And Its Farmers.    
Coveralls & Boots relate to my poultry operation and not my Beef operation. 
Thank you! Good Luck in M.S. Program.  
 
I don't want to give the impression that I am not concerned about disease or terrorism but 
a lot of farms have a heavy flow of people and automobiles, which make it quite a 
difference. I have a small operation, a cow-calf program in which I sell all my calves in a 
pool once a year. We take all precautions as far as vaccine and parasite controls are 
concerned. Have very few visitors. Extension Service would have the material or know 




With no "feedlot" markets in WV, no assistance available at a "common sense" 
practical/logical approach for beef producers. Why worry about agroterrorism? It is also 
obvious that the only thing [Commissioner of Agriculture] worries about is the next free 
trip w/ [wife]. He certainly has not tried to help in any way the cattle breeders in WV. 
 
I think this is a good survey. I also think we need to educate everyone in the U.S.A. about 
agroterrorism. There is too many people n the USA that doesn't even know where there 
food comes from. No Farm- No Food. 
 
We do not have a Biosecurity Plan for our farm. To my knowledge the WVU extension 
needs to start a program train their agents. Keep up the good work, maybe you can make 
a change for the farmers of WV 
 
Good Luck on Your Thesis! 
 
I am 84yrs old and just try to purchase a few cattle to summer on my limited amount of 
grazing. Our capacity is 15 to 20 head of yearlings. 
 
Best of Luck w/ your project. 
 
Note: The BSE Case in 2003 was economical disaster for cattle producers, yet Canadian 
Border still open. It is hard to take serious a threat of biosecurity when the policy of the 
USDA is to continue an open border policy for trade and market access to maintain a 
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cheap food supply. If we were really concerned for the safety of our national herds we 
would not continue to allow cattle pour across the borders from Canada and Mexico. 
 
If you would have meetings Cedar Lakes would be a great place to have them. 
 
Too old to Farm 
 
Extensions agents in previous years would visit my farm but the last two we've never 
seen, only at the fair. 
 



















Open Ended Responses 




Rail trail runs thru farm. The general public is invited there, by government organizations. 
Fire 
Prices of beef dropping 
Question 18 LA: If you suspected an act of terrorism (or breech of security) on your 
operation, from whom would you seek advice? 
Responses: 
Shoot the SOB 
FBI wife works there 
Handle myself 
Question 55 A: The likelihood you would contact the individual/agency for 
additional information about agroterrorism or livestock specific biosecurity threats. 
Responses: 
Stockyard 
Question 56: Do you have access educational material that can answer your beef 






Correll [sic] U. Local Vets, Drovers 
County Extension Agent 
County Extension Agent Ed Smolder  
Don’t Care! 
Internet 
Ever County High Schools Ag Dept. 
Ext. Agent 
Extension Agent (3) 
Extension Service, They have the material or can get it. 
Farm Magazine 
Farm Service Agency 




local and state specialist 
Magazines 
market bulletin 
market bulletin W.V. 
ON THE WEB 
PSU Ag  
USDA 







Question 68 A: How do you describe yourself? 
Responses: 
All of the above 
Owner/partner 
Lease out Ag Land 
Co-owner/Operator 
Raise beef for own use 
Operator-family member 
Partnership 
Question 69 A: Would you attend an educational program about 
agroterrorism/biosecurity? 
Responses: 
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